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By CHARLES E. RICE*
Discrimination in public accommodations presents the most appealing
case for compulsory civil-rights legislation. As Roy Wilkins testified before
the Senate Commerce Committee in 1963:
For millions of Americans this is vacation time. Swarms of families
load their automobiles and trek across country. I invite the mem-
bers of this committee to imagine themselves darker in color and to
plan an auto trip from Norfolk, Va. to the gulf coast of Mississippi,
say, to Biloxi. Or one from Terre Haute, Ind., to Charleston,
S. C., or from Jacksonville, Fla., to Tyler, Texas.
How far do you drive each day? Where and under what conditions
can you and your family eat? Where can they use a rest room?
Can you stop driving after a reasonable day behind the wheel or
must you drive until you reach a city where relatives or friends
will accommodate you and yours for the night? Will your children
be denied a soft drink or an ice cream cone because they are not
white?...
Where you travel through what we might call hostile territory
you take your chances. You drive and you drive and you drive.
You don't stop where there is a vacancy sign out at a motel at 4
o'clock in the afternoon and rest yourself; you keep on driving until
the next city or the next town where you know somebody or they
know somebody who knows somebody who can take care of you.
This is the way you plan it.
Some of them don't go.'
In practical terms, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has eliminated mch of
the existing segregation in public accommodations, and, with continued en-
forcement, the job should be soon completed even in the most hostile areas
of the South.2 The public-accommodations problem, therefore, is no longer
a live issue. It is useful, however, to touch upon it, for those who would re-
strain federal power are often challenged by the taunt, "What would you
do about public accommodations? Would you leave it up to the states? How
would you feel if you were a Negro?" The fact is that there is, or rather
was, a constructive alternative on this issue. That alternative was not only
*Assoiate Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., College of the Holy Cross, 195 3;
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1. Hearings on Civil Rights-Public Accommodations Before the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 656-57 (1963) .
2. See New York Times, June 27, 1965, p. 37, col. 1-3; see also President Johnson's report
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rejected, but it was done so in disregard of the clear intent of the Con-
stitution. A short explanation will serve to illustrate the operation in this
area of the impatience generally characteristic of the liberal approach to
racial matters.
In 1875, the Congress enacted a public-accommodations law, based solely
upon the fourteenth amendment, which was similar in its effect to the law
of 1964. The 1875 law did not require for its application that there be any
state governmental participation in the discrimination. The Supreme Court
held the law unconstitutional in the Civil Rights Cases3 in 1883. Justice
John Marshall Harlan, the grandfather of the justice of the same name now
on the Supreme Court, dissented, as he did in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 the 1896
case which approved "separate but equal" public facilities. The Court ma-
jority in the Civil Rights Cases concluded that the amendment, when it said
"No State" shall deprive any person of the equal protection of the
laws, meant just that and did not authorize congressional legislation
forbidding discrimination by individuals. The fourteenth amendment,
said the Court, "does not authorize Congress to create a code of
municipal law for the regulation of private rights but to provide
modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State
officers, executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental
rights specified in the amendment." 5 Mr. Justice Bradley, for the majority
of the Court, argued: "If this legislation is appropriate for enforcing the
prohibitions of the amendment, it is difficult to see where it is to stop.
Why may not Congress with equal show of authority enact a code of laws
for the enforcement and vindication of all rights of life, liberty and pro-
perty?" 6
The primary impact of the Civil Rights Cases arises from the holding that
the fourteenth amendment does not limit individual or private action, but
instead limits only the actions of a state. This requirement of state action
has survived to the present day in its essential elements, although more
peripheral types of state activity have been brought within the definition 7
and more categories of persons have become susceptible, owing to their status
or activity, to treatment as agents of the state whose action thereby becomes
"state action." s The Civil Rights Act of 1964, therefore, could not, insofar
as it is based upon the fourteenth amendment, reach the private proprietors
of restaurants and other public accommodations without deferring to the
state-action requirement of the fourteenth amendment. And the law as
3. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. Supra n. 3, at 11.
6. Id. at 14.
7. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) holding that enforcement by a state court
of a restrictive covenant, barring the sale of real property to Negroes, is state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
8. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) holding that a
lessee of state-owned property is bound by the fourteenth amendment in the conduct
of a restaurant on that property.
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enacted did so defer. It provided in section 201 (b) that, in certain named
types of public accommodations, "discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion or national origin" is prohibited if it is "sup-
ported by State action . . ..9 Such discrimination or segregation is sup-
ported by state action if it:
(1) is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance or
regulation; or (2) is carried on under color of any custom or
usage required or enforced by officials of the State or political
subdivision thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or
political subdivision thereof. 10
In contrast to its restricting reliance upon the state-action requirement
of the fourteenth amendment, in which respect it appears to be technically
constitutional, title II relies also and primarily upon the commerce clause
in article I, section 8 of the Constitution.1 1 The invocation of the com-
merce clause was necessary in order to reach those public accomodations
where there might not be sufficient "state action" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment and the civil-rights law's own broad definition
of that concept. Congressional regulations under the commerce clause, un-
like the fourteenth amendment, can operate directly upon individuals,
whether or not there is any state participation or state support involved in
the regulated actions of those individuals.
The congressional power to regulate commerce under the commerce
clause has received an increasingly expansionist construction in Supreme
Court decisions, especially since 1937.12 As long as the activity regulated af-
fects commerce, regardless of whether that effect is considered direct or in-
direct,13 and regardless of whether the impact upon commerce is substantial
or comparatively minute,' 4 the power of Congress to regulate that activity
will be upheld by the courts. In Wickard v. Filburn,15 in 1942, a farmer
raising twenty-three acres of wheat, all of which was to be consumed on his
own farm, was held to have such an effect on interstate commerce as to be
liable to marketing quotas fixed under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of
9. 78 Stat. 243 (1964) , 42 U.S.C. §2000a (1964).
10. Ibid.
11. 'The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
12. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), upholding the Wagner
Act as applied to labor relations in manufacturing enterprises affecting interstate com-
merce. Earlier in the thirties, the Court had invalidated some New Deal legislation as
violative of the commerce clause. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936) (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933).
13. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra n. 12, at 38, 41-42; Martino v. Michi-
gan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946) (Federal Fair Labor Standards Act
applies to employees of window-cleaning company which does the greater part of its
work on the windows of factories producing goods for interstate commerce).
14. See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946) (the publisher of a
daily newspaper, one half of one percent of the circulation of which is outside the
state of publication, is not by that fact exempt from federal Fair Labor Standards
Act).
15. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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1938; the Court's theory was that his growing and consuming of the grain
affected the interstate market by diminishing his purchases of grain raised
in other states. In effect, today, the only meaningful limitation upon the
power of Congress to decide what is interstate commerce and thus within
its regulatory power is the self-restraint of Congress itself.
In the public accommodations title (title II) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
Congress extended its interstate commerce power beyond the confines not
only of constitutional purpose but of the English language as well. One
example will suffice. Title II provides that racial discrimination is pro-
hibited in public accommodations (hotels, restaurants, gasoline stations,
theatres, etc.) which "affect commerce." "Commerce," in this context, means
commerce among the states, that is, interstate commerce. The operations
of such an establishment "affect commerce" if "it serves or offers to serve
interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves, or
gasoline or other products which it sells, has moved in commerce."16 In
December 1964, the Supreme Court upheld title II in two cases. In one,
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,17 the Court sustained the act
as applied to a motel which drew 75% of its guests from out of state. But
in Katzenbach v. McClung,'8 the establishment involved was Ollie's Barbe-
cue, a family-owned restaurant in Birmingham with no connection with
interstate travelers or interestate commerce other than the fact that 46%
(about $70,000 worth) of the $150,000 worth of food which the restaurant
purchased locally each year was "bought from a local supplier who had pro-
cured it from outside the State." The Supreme Court held that when Ollie
McClung served to his patrons meat which had been transported interstate
to the supplier from whom he bought it, Ollie's operations sufficiently af-
fected interstate commerce to bring him within the range of congressional
power.
Now think hard, and try to think of a single retail establishment of any
kind which could not be regulated by Congress under this sort of con-
struction. The closest I can come is a roadside stand at a farm selling apples
grown by the seller on his own farm. But what about the baskets? And the
insecticide? For the requirement in title II that a "substantial" portion of
the product sold shall have moved interstate is hardly a restraint upon fu-
ture congressional action in view of Court decisions which have recognized
congressional power where there is only a slight interstate involvement.' 9
Indeed, the Solicitor General of the United States was questioned on the
reach of this power in his argument of the Heart of Atlanta and McClung
cases before the Supreme Court:
Mr. Justice Harlan asked if the Solicitor General thought that Con-
gress could make it unlawful for a man to beat his wife if he smoked
16. (Emphasis added.)
17. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
18. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
19. See Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., supra n. 14; W\ickard v. Filburn, supra n. 15.
1966]
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cigarettes imported from another state. But, to Mr. Justice Stewart,
the question was: Could Congress "make it a federal offense for a
man to beat his wife with a baseball bat imported from another
state?"
The Solicitor General thought U. S. v. Sullivan, 332 U. S. 689,
might well permit Congress to so act under the Commerce Clause.
The Court there held, without dissent, that Congress has the power
to forbid a small retail druggist from selling drugs without the
form of label required by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act even though the drugs were imported in properly labeled bot-
tles from which they were not removed until put on the shelves of
the local retailer. However, the Solicitor General did not think the
government need go that far in this case. More appropriate, ac-
cording to the Solicitor General, are the many Fair Labor Standards
cases.
20
It is important to distinguish what the commerce clause ought to be
from the reality of what it has become under the post-1937 Supreme Court.
It is accurate to say that the commerce clause is a nullity today as a meaning-
ful restraint upon congressional power. This is true at least in the sense
that one cannot imagine any established commercial enterprise which would
be held not to "affect commerce" to a sufficient degree to warrant con-
gressional regulation by legislation, otherwise properly drawn, designed to
attain what the Congress and the Supreme Court consider a desirable social
objective. The only significant curb upon the federal commerce power today
must be found, if at all, in the self-restraint of the Congress. Not only is
this a departure from the meaning of the Constitution, but it is a develop-
ment which is, on its merits, destructive of the federal principle underlying
that Constitution.
However, it is not the purpose of this article to contest again a lost cause.
Title II is worthy of discussion here, not with any hope that the commerce
power will soon be restored to its proper dimensions, but rather because the
story illustrates the impatient temper of the liberal mind. For title 11 is
vulnerable also to the charge that its enactment was a precipitate rejection
of a promising, and hardly noticed, alternative in favor of a more dramatic
and hasty prohibition, the enactment of which, for all its short-term good
effects, has accelerated the disintegration of our republican form of govern-
ment.
The neglected alternative to title II is found in the 1963 case of Lombard
v. Louisiana2' which involved a sit-in demonstration protesting segregation
at a lunch counter in the McCrory store in New Orleans. Neither New Or-
leans nor Louisiana had any ordinance or statute requiring segregated eat-
ing facilities. The proprietor of the lunch counter, therefore, contended that
his decision to segregate was a purely private affair, in which no govern-
mental action or support was involved. Therefore, he claimed, there was no
20. 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3113 (1964).
21. 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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state action to activate the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court, however, speaking through Chief Justice Warren, found suf-
ficient state action in public announcements by the Mayor and the Superin-
tendent of Police of New Orleans which directed the demonstrations to be
halted and which, in the eyes of the Court, went beyond the nondiscrimina-
tory exhortations to preserve the peace which would have been permissible.
The Court found that the officials' statements, while ostensibly directed
merely toward the maintenance of peace, actually directed the continuance
of segregated service as such. Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, finding instead
that the statements did not counsel a maintenance of segregation, but ra-
ther "are more properly read as an effort by these two officials to preserve
the peace in what they might reasonably have regarded as a highly charged
atmosphere. ' '22 Although, on the facts of the case, Mr. justice Harlan appears
to have been correct in his interpretation of the statements, nevertheless
the basic principle underlying the Lombard decision is sound and offered a
satisfactory solution to the public-accommodations problem. This is so, even
though the Lombard ruling carried to its outermost limits the trend to find
state action in less direct and even incidental involvements of state or local
government officials. For a state can act in ways more subtle than the enact-
ment of a statute or an ordinance. When a state official throws the prestige
of his office onto the scales in an endorsement of otherwise private segrega-
tion, the result will usually be a predictable reinforcement of the private
party's determination to segregate. At the point where that public official's
encouragement becomes a substantial factor in the proprietor's decision to
segregate, the fourteenth amendment should be interposed to bar the dis-
crimination.
The principle of Lombard is not really novel. It is clear that a state can-
not escape its burden under the fourteenth amendment by cloaking its ac-
tion in a fictitious private character. Just as it violates the amendment for
a state to abolish its primary-election laws, but then encourage white
"private" primaries by according to the victor a place on the general-election
ballot,2 3 so it should be equally wrong for a state or city, having abolished
all statutes and ordinances promoting segregation, to encourage segregation
by public pronouncements of government officials. Nor does the relative
informality of a state's promotion of segregation insulate that promotion
from fourteenth amendment attack if a public official is actually involved.24
The Lombard approach, however, requires careful limitation. It should not
be carried so far as to bar genuinely private discrimination in areas where
the state has no legitimate interest, such as social discrimination in a home
or private club, merely because that discrimination has been encouraged by
22. 373 U.S. at 254.
23. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ; Rice v. Elmore 333 U.S. 875 (1948) .
24. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) holding that a system of in-
formal censorship of obscene literature, carried on by the Rhode Island Commission




public statements of public officials. The crucial factor in finding a suf-
ficient state interest ought to be the holding out of the premises as open
to the public. 25 If there are public statements by government officials en-
couraging segregation in such a facility, and if they constitute a substantial
factor in the proprietor's decision to segregate, "state action" ought to be
considered present. But even in establishments holding themselves open to
the public, a truly private decision to segregate, not substantially influenced
by official action, ought to be beyond the federal power.
And, of course, mere official enforcement of a neutral trespass or breach-
of-the-peace statute ought not to be of itself sufficient official action to acti-
vate the Lombard rule, even if the presence of such a statute, and the
prospect of its enforcement, is a source of encouragement to racially biased
proprietors. The inquiry should rather be directed toward official encourage-
ments of segregation as such. It is conceivable that official pronouncements
reminding the populace of the presence of trespass or breach-of-the-peace
statutes may in fact be covert devices to encourage segregation as such. State
action would seem to be present in such a case, not because of the existence
or enforcement of the statute, but rather on account of the official, though
devious, promotion of segregation as such. However, even where a pro-
prietor's decision to segregate is in keeping with a genuinely private local
custom favoring segregation in such establishments, there ought not to be a
finding of state action as long as the custom is not substantially influenced
by any formal or informal sanction on the part of public officials.
The relevance of the Lombard principle to title II of the 1964 Act is that
in Lombard the Court evolved a principle which, if applied with proper re-
straint, could have been employed to direct the anti-discrimination effort
into a more productive channel. The federal attack should be upon govern-
mental promotion of racial discrimination, rather than directly upon the
misguided discriminators. In fact, discrimination in public accommodations
would disappear in an acceptably short time when no longer nourished by
government patronage and encouragement. When, however, the federal of-
fensive is launched directly against the private citizens concerned, it not
only does violence to settled constitutional interpretations, but also entails
an encroachment upon the heretofore concededly state and private spheres
which ought not to be countenanced in the absence of a demonstrated and
overpowering necessity therefor. Moreover, an uncritical resort to com-
pulsion could retard the growing development of a free popular consensus
favoring equality of opportunity. In title II, unfortunately, the Congress
allowed the opportunity presented by Lombard to go by default, while em-
barking upon an approach which is wrongly conceived and could be self-
defeating in terms of the ultimate end to be attained. For the principal
objective of public policy in this area must be, not the seating of a Negro
25. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) treating a company-owned town as a mu-
nicipality because of its open character, despite its private ownership.
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at a hot-dog stand, but the promotion of a color-blind society. Title II
has succeeded in desegregating the hot-dog stands and other public accom-
modations and it is intended to advance the goal of color blindness. But in
its simplistic reliance upon coercion to achieve an appearance of integration,
in its encouragement of agitators and zealots through the wide extention
of its coverage, and in its implicit disparagement of the power of moral
persuasion, it entails a risk of unnecessarily harmful incidental effects.
The ethical imperatives in this issue are plain. Any attempt today to
justify, on its merits, racial discrimination in public accommodations is un-
tenable. And it is understandable, too, that some are disposed to eradicate
the evil through a precipitate use of federal power. One must be careful,
therefore, in sketching a position of dissent from title II of the 1964 Act,
to emphasize that the dissent is aimed, not at the perpetuation of discrimina-
tory practices, but rather at their speedy elimination within the frame-
work of a limited, constitutional government. For two things must be borne
in mind. One is that, even though title II achieves a prompt elimination of
discrimination in public accommodations, it still merits objection because
of its tendencies to intrude the federal power too far into the arena of per-
sonal choice and to aggrandize federal power at the expense of the essential
federal-state division of powers, which is a basic safeguard for the liberty of
all in this republic. Secondly, apart from questions of federalism and big
government, there simply is no necessary correlation between the elimina-
tion of segregation in public accommodations and the improvement of basic
race relations. Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia now forbid
racial discrimination in public accommodations of one sort or another.26
Incidentally, it is settled that a state or local statute or ordinance can con-
stitutionally forbid such discrimination, as an exercise of the reserved police
power of the states. 27 The federal government, by contrast, is one of specific
and limited powers, while the states possess the reservoir of general
governmental power.
Such state or local laws are obviously just, on the ground that when a
man opens a place of "public accommodation" to the public he ought to
have the right to refuse service to a man on account of his failure to wear a
coat and tie, but not on account of his race. For one cannot change his race
and it is unfair for a man to be excluded for that reason from an otherwise
public invitation to buy. In legal terms, state and local public-accommoda-
tions laws involve an extension of the class of businesses which are "clothed
with a public interest" and therefore forbidden to discriminate.28 As long
as they are limited in their coverage to places of public accommodation,
29
26. COMMISSION ON LAW & SOCIAL ACTION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, SUM-
MARY OF 1964 AND 1965 STATE ANTI-DIsCRIMINATION LAWS 3 (1966).
27. See Western Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363 (1907); People v. King, 110
N.Y. 418 (1888) ; see also Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
28. See Wolff v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
29. See N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §40.
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such as restaurants, barber shops, and retail stores and do not impinge upon
private clubs and confidential relations such as doctor-patient and attorney-
client, such laws are a reasonable implementation of public policy. Yet a
glance at the list of the states having such statutes or ordinances reveals that
it includes those northern states, such as New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, California, Illinois and others, where racial prejudice, friction and
violence are most prevalent. It may be said that things would be much
worse in those states if there were no public-accommodations laws. But it
is at least equally tenable to say that to eliminate segregation in public ac-
commodations is to attack a symptom, rather than a cause. Unless such an
attack is coupled with a real educational effort to harness the voluntary re-
sources within the American people, in the critical areas of education, em-
ployment, and housing, the effort will prove to be futile or worse. In an in-
discriminate quest for equality, the higher value of liberty could suffer
seriously, and this not alone in an infringement upon the property rights
of proprietors, but in a general undue encroachment upon that voluntarism
which, while not immune to some restriction and qualification, is still the
hallmark of a free society.
